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The cash economy enables, or at least significantly simplifies, many tax evasion 
schemes.  This is not surprising; after all, cash transactions can go unreported and 
therefore remain concealed from both regulators and creditors.  The tax collector 
operates as both a creditor and a regulator, which means that cash transactions impose 
negative externalities on tax collection and administration.  These externalities could be 
corrected through a relatively simple Pigovian tax that would be imposed, prior to  
cash-mediated transactions, every time cash was withdrawn from the financial system.  
Tax authorities would not collect any tax when cash would be deposited. 
This article argues that such a cash tax would make tax collection both easier 
and more accurate.  If a cash tax were imposed, most of the legitimate economy would 
shift to non-cash exchange methods.  In such a setting, cash transactions would be 
effectively limited to two categories: low-value transactions and transactions that benefit 
from the anonymity associated with cash.  Transactions associated with tax evasion and 
other types of criminal activities likely comprise most of the latter category.  Hence, 
because cash would comprise a relatively small portion of the formal economy's 
turnover, there are good reasons to believe that cash owners operating in the 
underground economy would be unable to roll over most of the cash-tax burden.  This 
means that most of the cash-tax incidence would fall on those who use cash to engage in 
tax evasion or other forms of unreported behaviors.  Such a cash tax would therefore 
reduce the lack-of-tax benefit associated with cash-based tax evasion along with the 
inequities and inefficiencies associated with it.  Furthermore, it would allow 
policymakers to comprehensively address the externalities associated with unreported 
transactions in the cash economy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Cash is a paradox.1  Why do individuals treat certain pieces of metal and paper 
differently from other similarly valueless objects?  Despite this paradox, cash is an 
indispensable part of modern economies and is part of a complicated monetary regime.2  
Even though we take it for granted that the pieces of paper in our wallet offer a reliable 
representation of our consumption power, this monetary regime is anything but trivial.3  
Money (and cash, as a form of money) allow people to engage in complicated exchanges 
and to store and account for value—which is in many ways an extraordinary 
development.4  
Cash, however, is just one form of money; unlike other forms, it has a dark 
side—individuals use it to conceal certain transactions from their creditors and the state.  
Why should governments support the use of cash?  After all, cash is anything but 
neutral—today, in developed economies where credit and debit cards are widely 
available, much of the cash in the economy is used for illegitimate purposes.5  Cash 
allows income underreporting, which is the most significant source of tax evasion,6 and is 
also used for criminal activities.7   
Policymakers and academics pay little attention to this dark side, even though the 
revenues lost due to evasion are gravely needed in most developed countries.  These 
countries face dire fiscal deficits and a tax-competitive global environment that make 
their debts increasingly difficult to service.  Furthermore, even when policymakers do 
address this dark side, they rarely do so in a comprehensive way: public finance literature 
focuses on how to detect unreported incomes in tax transactions; monetary literature 
focuses on the operational costs of cash as a method of exchange; and criminal law 
enforcement literature focuses on how to prevent money laundering.  None of these 
literatures, however, addresses the overall social costs of cash usage.  
The approach of taking cash as a given without trying to weigh its overall costs 
to society would have been understandable half a century ago.  At that time, cash was a 
public good that, despite its imperfections, provided many benefits that allowed the 
modern industrialized economy to develop.  Because cash had no real substitutes and 
accounted for almost all retail transactions, it made little sense to ask whether 
policymakers should try to assess the overall costs of cash to determine its optimal social 
use.8   
Social reality has changed, however. 9   Today, cash is an inferior, formal-
economy method of exchange (when compared to debit cards, for example), and the use 
                                                     
1
 See Narayana Kocherlakota, Money Is Memory, 81 J. ECON. THEORY 232 (1998). 
2
 BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS & LAURA ARIOVICH, MONEY AND CREDIT: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 7 
(2010). 
3
 Id. at 12, 24, 48. 
4
 Id. at 24. 
5
 See generally Gabriele Camera, Dirty Money, 47 J. MONETARY ECON. 377 (2001) (suggesting that 
approximately fifty percent of the cash stock is used to promote illegal activities in the shadow and criminal 
economies). 
6
 Joseph Bankman, Eight Truths About Collecting Taxes from the Cash Economy, 117 TAX NOTES 
506, *3 (2007). 
7
 See discussion infra Part I.C. 
8
 See, e.g., David B. Humphrey, Replacement of Cash by Cards in U.S. Consumer Payments, 56 J. 
ECON. & BUS. 211, 211 (2004) (noting that 150 years ago cash accounted for almost all transactions). 
9
 See id. (noting that many retail transactions have shifted to non-cash methods of exchange). 
68 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW  [Vol.4:65 
 
 
of electronic payment is widespread.10  If cash no longer remains a bare necessity, maybe 
the time has come to ask how to use it in an optimal way, what its benefits are, and 
whether the advantages justify its costs. 
This article confronts these questions by arguing that, even though money is a 
public good that is supplied by the state to support modern economic activity, the use of 
cash as a form of money allows market failures such as free-riding on government 
services.  Cash allows people to make anonymous, unrecorded transactions and thus to 
evade tax and avoid regulatory burdens associated with economic activities.  The ability 
to underreport tax on cash-mediated transactions imposes costs on society and therefore 
operates as a negative externality.  Thus, from a macro-social perspective, policymakers 
should optimize cash usage by requiring cash buyers and sellers in the cash economy to 
internalize its full range of costs. 
This article proposes that these costs be internalized through a cash tax imposed 
on cash withdrawals from any financial service institution.  This cash tax would not 
impose a tax on using or depositing cash and would not cover any non-cash transfers or 
consumption activity.  Instead, it would operate as a corrective-Pigovian tax11 intended to 
have parties internalize the costs that their activities impose on society. 
As a result of the cash tax, most of the legitimate, formal economy, which is not 
engaged in underreporting of cash transactions, would probably shift to non-cash 
methods of payment.  This suggests that the cash-tax burden would fall primarily on 
participants in illegitimate cash-economy transactions who engage in underreporting to 
attain the benefits of tax evasion and other regulatory violations.  
The justification for a cash tax stems from the difficulty of detecting illegitimate 
cash transactions.  This inherent challenge supports the concept that the costs of using 
cash should be imposed on cash usage as a whole.  It is important to note that the cash tax 
offers no magic solution for eliminating all harmful effects of cash-based income 
underreporting.  It offers an option to supplement existing policies that is viable only in 
high-income, developed countries that have an advanced financial sector.  Furthermore, 
even those regimes would require some easily implemented yet important changes before 
the cash tax could be operational.  Nevertheless, this article’s cash tax proposal provides 
a useful way of optimizing the scope of the cash economy by forcing cash users to 
internalize some of the negative externalities of tax evasion and criminal activity 
associated with cash usage.  
This article has three main contributions.  First, it departs from classic tax 
compliance literature with respect to the cash economy by offering an alternative 
practical approach to deal with cash-related evasion—one that goes beyond the classic 
paradigm that more audit-based enforcement reduces tax evasion.  Nobody likes to pay 
taxes, so collecting taxes is never easy.  Indeed, when it comes to cash-based 
transactions, collection is more difficult than in other types of transactions.  While the 
cash economy is widely recognized as the Achilles’ heel of tax collection,12 the literature 
on this issue typically emphasizes the need to invest more resources in detecting  
tax-evading cash transactions. This article’s proposal takes a different course by taxing 
the cash economy indirectly without distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate 
transactions.  Even though this article predicts that most of those paying the cash tax 
                                                     
10
 See infra notes 22–26 and accompanying text.  
11
 For a more precise definition of corrective (Pigovian) taxes, see infra note 86. 
12
  See discussion infra Part I.B. 
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would be individuals engaged in underreporting, the proposal is a rough-justice approach 
that does not distinguish between evaders and non-evaders.  This crude approach 
suggests that taxing cash transactions on a fault-free basis could help minimize the 
revenue loss, inefficiencies, and inequities of income underreporting more effectively 
than existing approaches. 
The second contribution relates to the cash tax's ability to calibrate the costs of 
cash along many margins.  The use of the cash tax is not restricted to countering tax 
evasion costs but could be implemented more generally to reduce the negative 
externalities associated with cash transactions.  This idea of comprehensively optimizing 
the costs of cash sharply contrasts the current tendency of different state agencies (tax 
authorities, criminal enforcement, and central banks) to deal with the cash costs from 
their own individual perspectives.13  
The third contribution relates to the way in which the proposal is presented.  
Rather than offering a bright-line solution that is simple yet unreasonable, this article 
acknowledges that the cash tax solution offers one of an array of tools that should be used 
to curtail tax evasion; the suggestion is not a panacea to the complex phenomenon of 
income underreporting.  Therefore, the analysis elaborates on which steps should be 
taken to implement a cash tax that would provide a reasonable and equitable policy 
alternative.  The analysis also recognizes that realistic constraints may dictate that tax 
authorities could only impose theoretically suboptimal cash-tax rates.   
The cash tax framework offers an important method to supplement existing 
policies for limiting the costs of the cash economy.  It opens a new debate about the cost 
of cash as a discrete issue and offers a concrete and realistic reform proposal that enables 
policymakers to consider the many costs and benefits of using cash as a medium of 
exchange. 
Part II briefly surveys the current literature about cash as a method of exchange 
and the literature dealing with the role that cash plays in facilitating tax evasion, shadow 
economy transactions,14 and criminal activities.  Part III begins by explaining current 
difficulties in reducing tax evasion in the cash economy.  It then explains the proposal 
and assesses the types of modifications that are necessary to make it administratively and 
politically plausible in high-income, developed countries.  Part IV explores the 
boundaries of the cash tax debate and suggests that the cash tax should be assessed in 
light of the wide array of externalities associated with using cash. 
II. CASHING IN ON PRIVACY: TAX EVASION AND THE SHADOW AND 
CRIMINAL ECONOMIES 
This part briefly surveys the economic literature about cash.  It emphasizes that 
cash provides a private, unidentifiable, and unrecorded medium of exchange.15  Hence, 
cash provides anonymity, which is a necessary feature of income-underreporting  
tax-evasion transactions, shadow economy exchanges, and criminal activities.  The first 
                                                     
13
 Most of the tax policy literature views cash transactions as an audit difficulty; the monetary 
regulation literature typically view cash only as an administratively costly method of exchange; and the 
criminal enforcement literature typically tries to capture cash transactions only when they involve large-scale 
money laundering activities.  For more information, see infra notes 120–122 and accompanying text.  
14
 See discussion infra Part I.C. 
15
 See, e.g., Matteo Ricciarelli, Transaction Privacy, Crime and Cash in the Purse: An Analysis with 
Household Data 2, 16 (Apr. 24, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.ec.unipg.it/DEFS/uploads/ricciarelli15_maggio.pdf. 
70 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW  [Vol.4:65 
 
 
sub-part explains the legitimate function of cash and also compares the benefits and costs 
of using cash to other methods of payment.  The second and third sub-parts explain the 
role that cash plays in facilitating tax evasion and other types of shadow-economy and 
illegal transactions. 
A. Cash in Context 
Money is essential in a modern economy because it functions as an accounting 
unit, a store of value, and a medium of exchange.16  It has emerged as a superior method 
of exchange because its uniform appearance, divisibility, and fungibility means that 
values of services and commodities can be standardized for different individuals.17   
Many objects can serve as money, and in different times and places many have—
ranging from pieces of metal to sophisticatedly printed paper notes to cowrie shells.18  
Though cash is just one form of money, until fairly recently, money and cash were 
synonymous—other than barter, cash was used as a method of exchange in almost every 
transaction.19  Today, however, money and cash are two separate things for most people 
living in developed countries.20  Cash is a set of physical objects that represent money, 
but most monetary assets are now disembodied and virtual, consisting of electronic 
accounting entries maintained in banks' computers.21  
This modern system has led to many alternative methods of exchanging money, 
including electronic transfers, checks, debt cards, and credit cards.22  In recent years, the 
use of cash as a medium of exchange has been decreasing in developed countries—debit 
and credit cards have gradually replaced even small, everyday purchases traditionally 
paid for in cash.23  The introduction of mobile-phone-based “e-purses” in countries like 
Japan suggests that this trend may even accelerate in the near future.24 
                                                     
16
 See CARRUTHERS & ARIOVICH, supra note 2, at 6; see generally Luis Araujo, Social Norms and 
Money, 51 J. MONETARY ECON. 241 (2004) (explaining why money is needed as a method of exchange in 
large economies). 
17
 See CARRUTHERS & ARIOVICH, supra note 2, at 52–71. 
18
 JOE CRIBB, MONEY 16 (1986); CARRUTHERS & ARIOVICH, supra note 2, at 7. 
19
 Humphrey, supra note 8, at 211.  
20




 See generally Jayasri Dutta & Martin Weale, Consumption and the Means of Payment: An 
Empirical Analysis for the United Kingdom, 68 ECONOMICA 293 (2001) (arguing that the demand for cash 
depends on the availability of credit); Humphrey, supra note 8, at 221–23; Charles M. Kahn et al., Money Is 
Privacy, 46 INT'L ECON. REV. 377, 377–78 (2005). 
23
 See generally Ron Borzekowski et al., Consumers' Use of Debit Cards: Patterns, Preferences, 
and Price Response, 40 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 149, 150 (2008); Hans Brits & Carlo Winder, 
Payments Are No Free Lunch 5–7 (August 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/1/1627/papers/Winder.pdf (providing information about the growing role of 
card payments in the Netherlands); Daniel D. Garcia-Swartz et al., The Economics of a Cashless Society: An 
Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Payment Instruments 81 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Reg. Studies, 
Related Publication 04-24, 2004), available at 
http://www.phoenixhecht.com/treasuryresources/PDF/Brookings_economics%20of%20a%20cashless%20soc
iety.pdf; Paul De Grauwe et al., Issues of Efficiency in the Use of Cash and Cards 13 (March 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at 
https://www.econ.kuleuven.ac.be/ew/academic/intecon/Degrauwe/PDG-
papers/Discussion_papers/ISSUESofEFFICIENCY.pdf (noting that cash usage rates differ among countries, 
with Italy and Spain having a more pronounced use of cash compared to other EU member states such as 
France and the United Kingdom); Humphrey, supra note 8, at 213, 216 (noting that, since the 1990s, debit 
and credit cards are increasingly replacing cash in retail transactions throughout the United States). 
24
 See Ruth Halpin & Roksana Moore, Developments in Electronic Money Regulation—the 
Electronic Money Directive: A Better Deal for E-Money Issuers?, 25 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 563, 
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The reduction in cash usage is considered to be a positive development.  Even 
though cash is often perceived as costless, it is in fact a relatively expensive method of 
exchange that requires central banks and other state agencies to invest resources in 
maintaining institutional integrity and preventing forgery.25  In light of both these public 
costs and other private costs, there is a general agreement that alternative payment 
methods—primarily the use of debit cards—involve lower social costs and therefore 
should be encouraged.26 
Nevertheless, people continue to use cash for a variety of reasons.  Individuals 
consider cash to be an inexpensive, convenient, and private medium of exchange with a 
low risk of fraud and abuse.  It is especially efficient for small retail purchases (those 
under $20), and it allows some people to better manage their personal budgets.27  
B. Cash and Tax Evasion 
A transaction that is not reported for income- or consumption-tax purposes 
creates an economic advantage in the form of saved tax payments.  This economic 
advantage potentially benefits the seller as well as the buyer, thus increasing the demand 
and supply for such economic activity.28  Hence, parties to transactions that could easily 
go unreported for tax purposes have a clear incentive to not report the exchanges. 
The classic modeling of tax-evasion behavior views taxpayers' decisions to evade 
taxes as a rational gamble, in which taxpayers weigh the probability of detection and 
penalty level against evasion payoffs.29  The impact of penalties on taxpayers' behavior is 
                                                                                                                                                 
564–68 (2009) (describing the difference in the implementation of e-money as a mass platform in Japan and 
the EU, and noting that cultural issues as well as high technology and uniform standardization made the 
penetration of e-money in Japan much more rapid). 
25
 See, e.g., Brits & Winder, supra note 23, at 8–15 (surveying the costs associated with different 
methods of payment); Leo Van Hove, On the War on Cash and Its Spoils, 1 INT'L J. ELEC. BANKING 36, 41 
(2008) [hereinafter Van Hove, War on Cash] (arguing that the circulation of notes and coins is labor intensive 
and costly); Leo Van Hove, Could “Nudges” Steer Us Towards a “Less-Cash Society”? 5 (Sept. 16, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1317360 [hereinafter Van Hove, Less-Cash 
Society] (providing estimates of these costs in different developed countries).  
26
 See, e.g., Ron Borzekowski & Elizabeth K. Kiser, The Choice at the Checkout: Quantifying 
Demand Across Payment Instruments, 26 INT'L J. OF INDUS. ORG. 889, 890–91 (2008) (arguing that card 
payments have lower social costs and that merchants’ reluctance to accept them instead of cash because of 
their private costs is welfare decreasing); Garcia-Swartz et al., supra note 23, at 17–18, 52–54 (surveying the 
literature about the relative advantages and disadvantages of card payments); CARL SCHWARTZ ET AL., 




 See Brits & Winder, supra note 23, at 26–31; CARLOS ARANGO & VARYA TAYLOR, BANK OF 
CAN., THE ROLE OF CONVENIENCE AND RISK IN CONSUMERS’ MEANS OF PAYMENT 2–3 (2009), available at 
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/dp09-8.pdf; Nicole Jonker, Payment Instruments 
as Perceived by Consumers—A Public Survey 9–11 (De Nederlandsche Bank, Working Paper No. 53, 2005); 
Ricciarelli, supra note 15, at 2; SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 26, at 127; Van Hove, Less-Cash Society, supra 
note 25, at 6–7. 
28
 Soren Pedersen, The Shadow Economy in Germany, Great Britain and Scandinavia: A 





 See generally Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical 
Analysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323 (1972); see also Susan Cleary Morse et al., Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion, 
20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 37, 38 (2009); Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, 
21  J. ECON. PERSP
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mixed, and there is no consistent evidence that imposing higher penalties significantly 
reduces instances of tax evasion.30  In contrast, the probability of detection is undoubtedly 
the most significant factor in motivating tax compliance—payments that are easily 
traceable and subject to third-party reporting requirements or third-party withholding are 
typically reported accurately.31 
It is difficult to characterize tax evasion because it comes in many forms and 
shapes and occurs in almost every type of profession; it may be done by otherwise legal 
businesses or by unlicensed or illegal ones.  There are, however, two main tax-evasion 
methods: underreporting income and overreporting deductible or creditable expenses.32  
This sub-part focuses on the income underreporting of the “hard-to-tax” cash 
sector.33  This sector typically contains small businesses with low to medium incomes 
that sell primarily at the retail level and often receive and make payments in cash.34  This 
can include self-employed taxpayers, such as professionals providing services (e.g., 
electricians); restaurants; sole proprietors; farmers; and other small business owners.35  
The agency costs of these businesses are small, so there are minimal non-tax business 
incentives for maintaining adequate accounts.36  The large number of taxpayers in this 
sector, and the relatively low income many of them have, render it inefficient to use 
expensive and intrusive audits to scrutinize more than a small fraction of them.37  Income 
underreporting relies on low-visibility transactions, and the revenues generated from cash 
transactions represent the most difficult-to-trace source of income.38  
Undoubtedly, the understanding of tax evasion as a social phenomenon is 
multilayered and complex, requiring explanations based on history, culture, and 
behavioral psychology.39  However, it is important to note that despite the great variations 
among societies, taxpayers, and evasion techniques, the ability to avoid detection by tax 
authorities offers the key factor in explaining why and how people evade taxes. 40  
Because the only major difference between cash and non-cash income is how easy it is to 
                                                     
30
 See Slemrod, supra note 29, at 38.  This is partly because risk aversion and cultures of 
compliance among groups and individuals differ and partly because sporadic anti-evasion enforcement makes 
it legally and politically difficult to impose high penalties on those few evaders caught.  See VITO TANZI, 
POLICIES, INSTITUTIONS AND THE DARK SIDE OF ECONOMICS 173–74 (2000). 
31
 Slemrod, supra note 29, at 37. 
32
  TANZI, supra note 30, at 172. 
33
 Victor Thuronyi, Presumptive Taxation of the Hard-to-Tax, in TAXING THE HARD-TO-TAX: 
LESSONS FROM THEORY AND PRACTICE 101, 102 (James Alm et al. eds., 2004). 
34
 Morse et al., supra note 29, at 49. 
35
 U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE 
TAX GAP 9 (2006) [hereinafter A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY]; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE TREAS., REDUCING THE TAX GAP: A REPORT ON IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 15 (2007) 
[hereinafter REDUCING THE TAX GAP]; James Alm et al., Sizing the Problem of the Hard-To-Tax, in TAXING 
THE HARD-TO-TAX: LESSONS FROM THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 33, at 11, 13; Joel Slemrod, Small 
Business and the Tax System, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 69, 90 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod 
eds., 2004); TANZI, supra note 30, at 172. 
36
 Alm et al., supra note 35, at 13. 
37
 Thuronyi, supra note 33, at 102. 
38
 REDUCING THE TAX GAP, supra note 35, at 15; see also Morse et al., supra note 29, at 39–40. 
39
  For an example of sophisticated research on this topic, see generally Adam Forest and Erich 
Kirchler, Targeting Occupations with Varying Reputations to Increase Tax Revenue, 39 J. SOC.-ECON. 400 
(2010) (analyzing anti-tax-evasion efforts in relation to social status); Erich Kirchler et al., Effort and 
Aspirations in Tax Evasion: Experimental Evidence, 58 APPLIED PSYCHOL. 488 (2009) (discussing tax 
evasion efforts). 
40
 Slemrod, supra note 29, at 37. 
2012] TAXING CASH 73 
conceal cash, taxpayers underreport cash payments rather than payments received 
through checks or other electronic payments.41  Therefore, the common perception among 
policymakers is that the very “nature of cash means that there will always be an 
opportunity for tax evasion by people dealing in cash.”42   
The tax-evasion practices associated with cash transactions have the following 
significant adverse effects. 43   First, they obviously have a problematic impact on 
governments' revenue collection.44   For example, although it is difficult to estimate, 
businesses in the hard-to-tax cash sector in the United States are believed by some to 
underreport their income by fifty percent (although there is a considerable variation 
among different types of businesses).45  Government officials and scholars estimate that 
income underreporting accounts for half of the revenues lost from tax evasion with 
respect to legal activities.46  Under conservative estimates, the total amount of federal 
income and employment taxes evaded by the cash sector every year is at least $100 
billion, or ten percent of lost revenues—making it the biggest source of revenue loss.47  In 
many other developed countries, this accounts for nineteen percent of lost revenues 
according to some measures.48  The direct costs of tax evasion also impact governmental 
spending because the need to fight tax evasion requires additional spending on tax 
administration.49 
The second adverse effect of cash-related tax evasion is the inefficiency 
associated with it.50  Cash usage and, correspondingly, tax evasion are far from uniform 
across different sectors of the economy.51  Hence, the ability to avoid costs by using cash 
provides taxpayers with an incentive to shift their activities into the cash economy.52  
This subsidy artificially inflates the cash sector without necessarily increasing the  
after-tax returns of those operating within it.  In a competitive market, the increased 
incentives to work in the cash sector will increase the supply and push down the price for 
those activities.53  In addition to the misallocation of resources between the cash and  
non-cash sectors, the use of cash for tax-evasion purposes imposes operational 
                                                     
41
 This is true even though it is equally complex to report cash and non-cash transactions and, from 
a psychological perspective, similarly difficult to share them with the government.  See Bankman, supra note 
6, at 7; Morse et al., supra note 29, at 37, 40 (describing studies that show that individuals are more likely to 
underreport income generated from cash payments than from checks). 
42
  AUSTRALIAN TAX OFFICE, IMPROVING TAX COMPLIANCE IN THE CASH ECONOMY 1 (1997); see 
also TANZI, supra note 30, at 172 (suggesting that cash evasion is a phenomenon that relates to the economic 
structure of the economy and is more prevalent in small businesses). 
43
 Slemrod, supra note 29, at 41. 
44
 Glen Hepburn, Estimates of Cash-Based Income Tax Evasion in Australia, 25 AUSTL. ECON. 
REV. 54, 60 (1992). 
45
 Morse et al., supra note 29, at 39; Slemrod, supra note 29, at 29. 
46
 Morse et al., supra note 29, at 37–38; Eric Toder, What Is the Tax Gap?, 117 TAX NOTES 367, 
376–77 (2007) (explaining how the tax gap estimates are generated, their strengths, and their weaknesses). 
The United States is considered to have high tax compliance, so one can expect that these estimates would 
also be true for other developed countries. 
47
 Joseph Bankman, Tax Enforcement: Tax Shelters, the Cash Economy, and Compliance Costs, 
31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005).  
48
 Alm et al., supra note 35, at 29 (noting also that the revenue loss due to the cash economy in 
developing countries accounts for fifty-seven percent of revenues). 
49
 Id. at 26.  
50
 Id. at 33 (summarizing the different inefficiencies associated with tax evasion); Bankman, supra 
note 6, at 1–2. 
51
 Bankman, supra note 47, at 8; Slemrod, supra note 29, at 41. 
52
 Bankman, supra note 6, at 1–2. 
53
 Bankman, supra note 47, at 7–8. 
74 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW  [Vol.4:65 
 
 
inefficiencies that reduce the productivity within the cash sector.  These include a wide 
array of costs ranging from anxiety and higher audit-related compliance costs to 
difficulties of attaining economies of scale.54  Another tangible cost of underreporting 
income for tax purposes is the tendency to avoid depositing cash proceeds into the 
financial sector.  This restricts the credit available for cash businesses, which forces them 
to rely on self-financing and also requires them to undertake costs associated with storing 
and spending the cash.55 
Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, the impact of tax-evasion activities in the cash 
sector on issues of distributional equity is ambiguous.56  On the one hand, it is clear that 
many of the people employed in the cash sector are low-paid workers or small 
businesses.  On the other hand, affluent taxpayers own many of these small businesses.57  
Additionally, it is not clear that those working in the cash economy are the ones who 
capture the benefits of tax evasion, given the increased supply of labor in that sector.58  
Consumers in the cash economy, who tend to have higher incomes and education, share 
at least some of the lack-of-tax cash subsidy because they receive reduced-cost services 
and goods.59  
Overall, tax evasion is most clearly inequitable for honest and risk-averse sellers 
and service providers in the cash economy who report their incomes.  A housepainter or 
nanny who reports income cannot charge more for services than the market rate of return 
(which assumes cash payment and tax evasion).  As a result, tax-evasion practices force 
otherwise honest taxpayers who operate in cash-sector activities to misreport their 
income to align with market practices or to seek different employment opportunities 
where they can compete without evasion.60  
C. Cash, the Shadow Economy, and Criminal Activities 
This sub-part explains how cash transactions facilitate two additional types of 
illegal economic activities—shadow economy transactions and criminal transactions.  
The definition of the shadow economy varies and can, under different accounts, include 
three types of activities: unreported income from legal transactions, which are unreported 
mostly for tax-evasion purposes; unreported income from regulation-avoiding 
transactions, that aim to evade both taxes and regulation; and unreported income from 
criminal transactions, in which the sale of goods and services itself is considered to 
reduce social welfare and is therefore illegal (e.g., drugs and sexual services).61  There are 
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obviously overlaps among these categories in the sense that they all involve illegal tax 
evasion, which carries criminal liability. 62   Furthermore, the evasion of income, 
employment, and consumption taxes is typically considered a major incentive for 
operating within the black market.63  Nevertheless, this article addresses these categories 
separately.  
The first category represents income-generating activity that is unreported “just” 
to evade taxes.  The social costs associated with this activity have largely been addressed 
by the previous sub-part.  Tax evasion results in lower revenues, increased compliance 
costs, major misallocation of resources, and some potential inequities.  The second and 
third categories, which are addressed by this sub-part, represent off-the-books economic 
activities engaged in by unregulated businesses and criminal actors.  
To avoid confusion between the different categories, this article uses the term 
“shadow economy” to refer only to the sale of (legal) goods and services that is 
unreported to avoid non-tax-related regulations.  Accordingly, under this classification, if 
a housepainter fails to report his cash income to evade taxes, it would be considered a 
tax-evasion transaction, not a shadow economy transaction.  But a gardener who does not 
report his income because he is hiring illegal immigrants and paying them less than 
minimum wage would be considered part of the shadow economy—because in this 
setting cash facilitates both tax evasion and regulatory avoidance.  Illegal drug dealing 
would be considered an illegal transaction and not part of the shadow economy—even if 
the drug dealer hires illegal immigrants and even if he pays them less than minimum 
wage.  While evading taxes and violating minimum wage and immigration laws may all 
be subject to criminal penalties, the distinction between those activities and selling drugs 
is the legality of the commercial activity itself.  Selling drugs is illegal per se, whereas 
house painting and gardening are legal activities, so that the illegality of the above 
examples stems from the way that these activities are conducted and underreported. 
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The question of why individuals choose to operate in the shadow economy has 
been subject to a considerable amount of social science research.65 Other than evading 
their taxes, individuals operating in the shadow economy seek to avoid a whole array of 
costs associated with interacting with the government.  These costs can vary considerably 
and range from registration and license fees to payments made in order to bribe corrupt 
officials.66  Operating in the informal shadow economy also provides flexibility with 
respect to a wide array of regulatory costs, including immigration restrictions and 
employment regulations concerning minimum wage and retirement.67 
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As with tax evasion, in unreported cash transactions, cash is an important 
component of the shadow economy's attempt to hide from government regulatory 
scrutiny.  In fact, when it comes to the shadow economy, there is an almost total reliance 
on cash, one of the main characteristics of this market.68  Even though it is very difficult 
to obtain reliable information about criminal activities, it is clear that both domestic and 
international criminal activities rely on cash as an almost exclusive method of 
exchange.69  As in the case of shadow-economy and tax-evasion activities, the records of 
non-cash payments are risky and may lead to detection and high-penalty incrimination.70  
Cash as a supplier of secrecy is an important component of shadow and criminal 
activities.  The anonymity of cash allows sellers, service providers, and buyers (in the 
case of criminal activities) operating in the cash economy to go undetected.  Cash as an 
institution also provides those operating in these illegal markets with a link to the formal 
economy in the form of an anonymous and general consumption power.  
Because almost all shadow-economy and criminal transactions are mediated 
through cash, and therefore easily remain unrecorded, measuring the overall size of the 
shadow and (even more so) criminal economies is difficult.71  Nevertheless, the shadow 
economy is believed to account for roughly ten to twenty percent of the GDP in  
high-income developed countries.72  Criminal activities are estimated at many billions of 
dollars annually in the United States alone.73  
III. A PIGOVIAN CASH TAX 
A. The Deadlock in Confronting Cash Based Tax Evasion 
The literature on tax evasion suggests that there are no silver-bullet solutions for 
reducing tax evasion associated with underreporting of cash transactions. 74   When 
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detection probabilities are low, high penalties rare, and government services universal (or 
at least not conditioned upon tax payment), evading taxes is rational free-riding behavior.  
The key to effective tax enforcement thus requires reliable as well as readily 
observable and easily analyzable information.  Accordingly, third-party information 
reporting and withholding have been the prime mechanisms through which tax authorities 
have successfully reduced tax-evasion activities.75  In the cash economy, however, this 
type of third-party information reporting is very difficult to enforce—especially with 
respect to retail activities by the self-employed and small businesses.76  
The main enforcement tools that tax authorities use to deter tax evasion by  
cash-based businesses are audits and the threat of criminal penalties.77  However, audits 
are expensive and often insufficient to uncover underreporting of cash income 
activities.78  Although audits result in increased revenues, civil and criminal penalties are 
rarely used against legal small businesses, so their deterrence impact is limited. 79  
Furthermore, perhaps because audits are politically unpopular, the rate of audits and 
criminal prosecutions have been decreasing.80  
There are some useful ways to attempt to reduce tax evasion.  For example, tax 
authorities can invest in information technologies and try to trace certain unusual 
purchases (e.g., luxury goods such as vacation homes and yachts) by self-employed 
taxpayers that typically indicate tax-evasion activities. 81   Nevertheless, while these 
actions are probably cost-efficient, they are still likely to require expensive audits and 
their effectiveness will be reduced by taxpayers' behavioral adjustments to them.82 
The difficulty of confronting income underreporting in the cash economy has 
long-lasting effects on governments' abilities to raise revenues in the future because the 
widespread nature of cash-based evasion practices entrenches non-compliance norms.  
While most people tend to obey the law because of a mixture of respect for the political 
process and risk aversion to penalties, non-compliance by the cash sector seems to be an 
exception.  These non-compliance norms make it more difficult to enforce compliance 
with tax law.83  
B. Taxing the Cash Economy Through ATM Machines 
This article advances a proposal that would limit the revenue loss, inefficiencies, 
and potential inequities associated with cash-based tax evasion by imposing a tax on 
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cash.  This cash tax would be imposed every time cash is withdrawn from the financial 
system as a fixed percentage of the overall amount.  No tax would be collected, however, 
when cash is deposited into the financial system.  
This proposal responds to the facts that mitigating cash-based tax evasion 
through traditional audits is difficult, that tax is a facilitator of many tax-evasion 
transactions, and that much of the cash used today is directed towards illegitimate ends.  
Rather than discovering and punishing tax evasion, the proposal provides more of a level 
playing field between the formal and informal economies in developed countries.  Its 
main theme is that, once a cash tax is imposed, taxpayers will adjust their behaviors so 
that cash will be used primarily for unreported transactions.  If that is indeed the case, the 
incidence of the cash tax will fall primarily on unreported income.  This sub-part explains 
the main attributes of the proposal.  The next sub-part assesses the proposal and goes into 
the fine-tuning that an efficient and equitable implementation of the proposal would 
require.  Part IV then discusses how policymakers should determine the actual tax rate. 
The proposal assumes that it is neither possible nor desirable to eliminate  
cash-based income underreporting.  Cash is an efficient payment method for small 
transactions or legal transactions that require privacy (e.g., to avoid identity theft).  Cash 
would therefore probably still be used as a method of exchange even if all income 
underreporting were curtailed.  
Cash users should nevertheless account for the fact that cash entails many social 
costs associated with income underreporting.84  Hence, since the use of cash is not free, to 
truly optimize the use of cash, its users should internalize the social costs associated with 
underreporting.  Currently, cash is offered to consumers for its par value—without 
carrying the price of its externalities.  Naturally, without a clear price signal on its true 
cost, consumers inefficiently overuse cash.  
The use of cash for unreported (i.e., tax-evading) transactions is not  
incidental— one could expect that many cash transactions within the legal economy are 
deliberately designed to attain tax-evasion benefits.  Additionally, as mentioned,85 most 
of the currency stock in developed countries is used to purchase shadow economy or 
criminal goods and services.  Those attributes that make cash attractive—fungibility, 
divisibility, and anonymity—are precisely those that prevent tax authorities from 
identifying cash transactions that are part of an underreporting scheme.  Hence, while 
cash is a legitimate method of exchange, a Pigovian tax on cash would optimize its 
usage.86  This tax would not be as precise as income, employment, or consumption taxes 
in assessing taxpayers' economic well-being, but it would use an indirect means to 
ascertain tax liability by cash usage—which would roughly aim to capture the taxes lost 
due to cash-based tax evasion.  
With some qualifications, which will be elaborated upon in the next sub-part, 
implementing the proposal would be relatively simple.  The cash tax would be a 
withholding tax imposed at the point of entry—when cash is withdrawn from any bank or 
other regulated financial institution (including debit-based cash-back services, mutual 
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funds, money services, etc.).87   Cash deposited in the financial sector would not be 
subject to any type of tax.  The cash tax would therefore operate as a presumptive tax—
realistically assuming that much of this cash is probably withdrawn to generate 
unreported income.  
In essence, the proposal puts significant emphasis on the role of the financial 
sector.  The operating assumption is that tax authorities have access to transactions made 
through financial intermediaries.  In the formal economy, financial intermediaries play a 
crucial role in providing revenue agencies with information about transactions made and 
assets held by taxpayers.  The growing number of information-reporting requirements 
that tax authorities in developed countries impose upon financial institutions (e.g., 
reporting income derived from financial investments) suggests this is, indeed, the case.88  
The relatively low level of underreporting with respect to income subject to third-party 
information reporting suggests that taxpayers have internalized this indirect regulatory 
function of financial institutions.  
This article argues that, when financial intermediaries cannot operate as 
information providers because they supply their consumers with difficult-to-trace cash, 
they should operate instead as tax withholders.  This proposal meshes well with the  
tax-administration experience, which suggests that third-party information reporting and 
withholding are the most successful methods of inducing tax compliance.89  That the cash 
tax would be an indirect withholding tax also highlights a limitation—namely that it 
should be a fixed rate and not vary according to the amount withdrawn or the taxpayer’s 
income.  Withholding taxes is an effective tax enforcement mechanism when it is crudely 
enforced because the tax withholder does not have sufficient information about the 
taxpayer.  Accordingly, as the next sub-part demonstrates, to the extent that the cash tax 
has undesirable distributional effects, it will likely be corrected by other means.  
To some, the use of a presumptive Pigovian tax may seem awkward—after all, a 
certain cash note can circulate multiple times.  Some of these transactions may not 
involve tax evasion and therefore bear no negative externality—indeed some cash 
transactions probably even have certain positive externalities.90  This type of critique 
suggests that Pigovian taxes should usually be laid only in those cases in which the harm 
is directly correlated with the activity.  For example, every gallon of gasoline one uses 
inflicts a cost on the environment, in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, which is directly 
correlated with the amount of gasoline used.    
However, Pigovian taxes are also employed when the harm is not directly 
correlated with the usage.  For example, many countries apply such taxes with respect to 
alcohol and tobacco consumption—even though consumption at low levels does not 
result in negative externalities.  While excessive alcohol and tobacco consumption may 
indeed have significant negative externalities, the same indirect Pigovian tax rate is 
imposed on both light and heavy smokers and drinkers.  Therefore, the observation that a 
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Pigovian tax on cash is inappropriate because some cash transactions have positive 
externalities serves merely as an example of why the perfect theory is often the worst 
enemy of a sound policy.  Cash is fungible and anonymous, and tax authorities cannot 
distinguish among its uses at a reasonable cost—which is exactly why there is a need for 
a blunt instrument like the cash tax.  As with tobacco, alcohol, and many other Pigovian 
taxes, policymakers would impose the cash tax to control the aggregated amount of 
externalities rather than try to trace the externalities associated with each individual 
transaction.  A determination of this aggregated level derives from two factors: the extent 
to which cash is misused and the extent to which the cash tax would shift “legitimate” 
transactions out of the cash economy and the costs associated with that shift.  The 
previous part elaborated on the first factor; the following paragraphs elaborate on the 
second factor.  Taken together, these two factors suggest that the indirect cash tax on 
withdrawals would more closely resemble an indirect Pigovian consumption tax on petrol 
than a similar tax on alcohol or tobacco because it would apply almost entirely to cash 
transactions that have negative externalities.  
Such a highly visible and salient cash tax would trigger two opposite behavioral 
responses.  The first response would be by taxpayers who use cash in legitimate 
transactions, which include legal transactions in the formal economy where the consumer 
is not (knowingly or implicitly) part of an income-underreporting scheme.  The crux of 
the matter is that once a cash tax is imposed, the amount of cash used to facilitate 
legitimate transactions would significantly drop.  This would mean that most of the 
remaining cash transactions would involve some type of illegitimate underreporting 
objective.  An example of such a transaction would be payment of cash at the 
supermarket or any other type of (typically large) business that accepts cash and other 
methods of payment without offering a cash discount.  Consumers in these transactions 
would limit the use of cash to very small purchases where the convenience value of using 
cash was greater than the costs imposed by the cash tax.  With respect to all other 
transactions, these consumers would try to shift to other methods of payment—assuming 
that such methods are cheap and widely available—to avoid the cash tax.  Even relatively 
low tax rates would result in most legitimate transactions in the formal economy to shift 
away from cash.  This is important because it suggests that, at least technically, the cash 
tax would be paid mostly by those participating in the shadow economy.  The next  
sub-part elaborates on how to ensure this type of availability, but for now it is enough to 
assume that buyers and sellers in the fully reported formal economy would not want to 
absorb the cash tax on top of other tax liabilities. 
The other behavioral response would be to avoid depositing cash in the financial 
sector by shifting to cash substitutes.  Given that cash that enters the financial sector 
would be subject to the cash tax upon withdrawal, non-deposited cash would be worth 
more than deposited cash.  At moderate levels of cash-tax rates, this second response has 
its limits, however, because holding a large amount of cash assets entails considerable 
storage and security costs.91  The next sub-part addresses this issue in greater detail and 
considers various low-cost and practical ways to limit the negative impact of these 
behavioral tendencies on the effectiveness of the cash-tax.  
These two behavioral responses highlight why the proposal could only be 
successfully implemented in high-income developed countries.  These countries have 
advanced financial and communication services that allow for other forms of payment, 
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such as checks and cards.  For example, big employers in these economies, and indeed 
their governments, typically use monetary transfers to pay their suppliers and employees.  
The financial sectors in these countries offer valuable credit and financial services that 
allow businesses to expand.  Hence, legitimate businesses and taxpayers have incentives 
not to maintain cash but to channel payments through the financial sector—because it is 
cheap, safe, and reliable and makes them credit-worthy.   
Another reason why the cash tax could only be implemented in high-income 
developed countries relates to the relatively low magnitude of the cash economy in these 
countries.  As mentioned, in high-income countries cash economies represent a 
significant part of the GDP, but most economic activity takes place in the formal reported 
economy.92  Members of the cash economy who want to use their cash purchasing power 
would have to use a substantial amount of it in the formal economy, which in turn would 
provide incentives to deposit or invest at least most of that cash in the financial sector.  
The above analysis suggests that the cash-tax incidence would fall primarily on 
those taxpayers who participate in cash transactions that involve some type of 
underreporting.  If the legitimate economy shifts to non-taxed money transfers, cash 
holders would be primarily those participating in underreported transactions.  Given that 
the size of the cash economy is relatively small, cash users would not be able to 
significantly affect marginal prices.  This means that, rather than rolling the tax burden to 
the legitimate economy, cash users would have to internalize it.  
Consider a bartender who receives most of her salary as tips paid in cash, which 
she does not report as income and which she does not deposit.  When that bartender 
decides to purchase goods and services in the legitimate economy (e.g., a new car, 
daycare services, or prescription drugs) she will not be able to ask for a discount for 
paying in cash.  The vast majority of consumers would use non-cash payments, and the 
car dealer, nursery, and pharmacy would prefer to sell those consumers the goods and 
services than to give the bartender a discount.  Accordingly, the effect of the cash tax on 
the price equilibrium in the formal economy is likely to be small.  Put differently, if a 
high-income developed country implemented the cash tax, cash economy participants, 
who rely on the anonymity of cash to avoid reporting their (essentially free-riding) 
economic activities, would not have sufficient market power to roll over the tax burden to 
the legitimate economy. 
Theoretically, the appropriate cash-tax rate should, at the very least, attempt to 
mimic the amount of revenues lost due to unreported transactions.  The cash tax is 
assumed to be a rough approximation of the income, consumption, and employment taxes 
that would have been levied if all transactions were reported.  Hence, the cash-tax burden 
should aim to reduce the non-compliance benefits of using cash so as to reduce the 
inefficiencies and potential inequities of the cash economy. 
C. The Devil in the Details: Assessment of the Proposal’s Practicality 
The above sub-part stresses the main features of the cash tax.  While the idea behind a 
Pigovian cash tax is relatively simple, this article does not suggest that it could currently 
be implemented in any high-income developed country.  To make the cash tax a useful 
policy tool in managing the harmful effects of income underreporting, a few 
administrative and political concerns should first be addressed.  This sub-part identifies 
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three major types of concerns—distributional issues, taxpayers' avoidance by use of 
substitute (for cash and financial institutions), and windfall to current cash holders. 
 
1. Concerns Over the Distributional Impact of the Cash Tax 
The first set of objections relates to the fact that cash usage is not uniform across 
society.  Certain groups—e.g., low-income taxpayers, the elderly, and men—tend to use 
cash to purchase a higher percentage of their overall consumption. 93   In fact, as  
high-income, well-educated consumers have shifted to card payment methods, cash has 
gradually become identified as the method of exchange among the low-income 
population.94  This is partly a result of convenience95 but also because poor people are 
more likely to supply services and produce goods in the cash and shadow economies and 
therefore tend to have more cash available.96  
Moreover, financial institutions may underinvest in providing and promoting 
financial services for low-income individuals and small businesses.97   The relatively 
small amount of financial resources that low-income individuals possess, and the 
relatively low turnover of small businesses, make it less attractive for private providers of 
financial services to offer universal checking accounts and electronic transfer services.  
Hence, unless some actions are taken, the cash tax will have a regressive distributional 
impact, which would make it politically difficult to implement. 
As mentioned, allowing cash-based income underreporting is a very inaccurate 
and inefficient method of redistribution.98  Consumers of the cash economy, rather than 
providers of goods and services who underreport income, are the main beneficiaries of 
the lack-of-tax subsidy to the cash economy.  Furthermore, many of the consumers in 
illegitimate cash transactions 99  (e.g., gardening and house cleaning services) are  
high-income, well-educated individuals who are fully aware of income underreporting by 
their counterparts who receive cash for their services.100  
To prevent the cash tax's burden from falling on low-income individuals who are 
not willing parties to income underreporting transactions, the following steps should be 
taken.  Some of the cash-tax proceeds should be diverted to creating a “public option” of 
low-cost financial services.  Participating governments should enable every adult resident 
to open a free checking account to obtain a debit card and perhaps also to issue a limited 
number of pay-to-order personal checks (that would also be limited in amount).  The 
government could easily and cheaply provide these services through the post office—and 
indeed several Western European countries (e.g., Germany) use their post offices as 
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public banks.101   Furthermore, the government should assure that low-cost electronic 
payment services are available for all small businesses.  Additionally, transfers should be 
made to certain groups for whom adjusting to non-cash methods of payment would be 
more expensive and time-consuming (e.g., the elderly and people living in remote areas).  
The transfers made to these groups should gradually decrease over time, however: in the 
long run, a shift of consumers to non-cash methods of payment requires reasonable 
learning costs from most people.102 
While these measures are not free of cost, they are not terribly expensive or 
difficult to achieve.  Their overall cost should be weighed against the additional cash-tax 
revenues and the additional income, employment, and consumption tax revenues that 
would result from the increased reporting.  In developed countries, many people have 
checking accounts, so the number of individuals who would need the public option 
should be relatively small.  Additionally, most private-sector businesses that seek to 
attract middle-class consumption power are likely to already accept card payments.  
However, if the market for card services is not competitive, as is frequently the case,103 
the cash tax may increase the monopoly rents of card issuers and allow them to increase 
their interchange fees.  While large retailers may have sufficient market power to resist 
such an increase, this increase may adversely affect small retailers. 
The most administratively-efficient way to address this concern may be through 
antitrust regulation—but this type of solution may be politically difficult to implement.  
Hence, to the extent that card interchange fees are considered too burdensome on small to 
medium businesses,104 providing a limited refundable tax credit for small businesses' 
interchange payments should operate as a carefully tailored low-cost subsidy that would 
substantially reduce these concerns.105  
Overall, there are reasons to believe that the costs of these public option financial 
services and transfers would be relatively small as compared to the direct and indirect 
cash-tax revenue gains.  Investment in providing the necessary public option and transfer 
payments support for the cash tax is even more justified if the cash tax would help reduce 
the cash economy and some of the inefficiencies associated with it.  
2. Concerns Over the Shift to Substitutes 
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 In many developed countries, only a few corporations, such as MasterCard or Visa, may control 
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businesses are subject to a low tax rate, or none at all.  As a result, these payments may put them at a 
competitive disadvantage. 
105
 A carefully designed refundable tax credit for small business would provide a low-cost direct 
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provide only a percentage of the interchange cost (e.g., 15–30%, to maintain small businesses’ incentive to 
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some of the distributional concerns over the cash tax's impact on small businesses, some of the tax credit 
subsidy is almost certainly bound to “leak” to the credit card companies, which would be able to charge 
higher interchange rates. 
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The other concern that should be addressed is how to curtail the attempts of 
taxpayers to avoid the cash tax, either by using cash substitutes or by substituting 
domestic financial services with other forms of financial services.  There are many 
substitutes to cash as a method of payment, such as barter, foreign currencies, and 
transferable checks.  At the outset, it is clear that there are no perfect substitutes for 
domestic currencies—barter transactions would be limited in a cash-tax environment as 
they are today, foreign currencies carry foreign exchange risk, and anonymous checks 
carry considerable credit risks and legal enforcement risks resulting from the high 
possibility of fraud.  Nevertheless, the cash-tax regime should try to limit the scope of 
abuse by taking a few simple steps: taxing foreign cash withdrawals from domestic 
financial institutions;106 requiring that all personal checks by default be made-to-order, so 
that they are paid only to the named payee;107 and/or stipulating that non-order checks be 
subject to the cash tax when refunded or deposited. 
The cash tax cannot prevent some of the more sophisticated barter transactions.  
However, as the following examples illustrate, the scope of this manipulation is costly 
and limited.  Consider a lawyer operating in the non-cash economy who can purchase 
groceries on behalf of his housekeeper using his debit card.  This transaction would be 
subject to consumption tax, but would still allow the housekeeper's income to remain 
unreported.  This type of manipulation is unavoidable, but it also has some serious 
limitations.  The transaction may involve substantial time-related transaction costs to the 
lawyer and may not account for some of the housekeeper's most substantial expenses, 
such as mortgage payments.  Therefore, the lawyer is probably unable to afford to engage 
in such a transaction with most of his service providers, with whom he may have little 
acquaintance, or when large amounts of money are involved.  Perhaps most importantly, 
the payment in this transaction severely limits the circulation of cash because the money 
is immediately deposited in the non-cash economy.  The housekeeper can avoid reporting 
income but cannot then use that income to further engage in unreported cash transactions.  
Alternatively, the lawyer may pay his housekeeper with gift cards.  By buying 
these gift cards with his debit card, he would pay the consumption taxes associated with 
this purchase.  The benefit of this transaction is that the housekeeper can then use those 
gift cards as cash equivalents to make tax-free purchases in the cash economy.  While it 
is possible to eliminate this avenue of abuse by forcing some type of identification 
requirement for purchasing and subsequently using the gift cards,108 this type of strategy 
may involve non-trivial regulatory costs.109  However, it is important to bear in mind that 
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these costs may not be necessary because of the natural limitations of such a strategy.  As 
in the previous example, the housekeeper may be unable to pay for all expenses using gift 
cards, and there could be a problem in verification that would make these exchanges 
unpractical when there is no personal acquaintance or when large amounts of money are 
involved.  Evidence suggests that there may be a market for cash substitutes (e.g., food 
stamps) but that these are typically sold at a significant discount, and rational taxpayers 
would therefore prefer to pay the (probably) lower cash-tax rate.110   
Cash taxpayers may also seek to avoid the cash tax by looking for substitutes in 
the domestic financial sector.  Because cash accumulation is a low-yield yet risky 
investment strategy, many taxpayers may seek to either continuously spend their cash or 
deposit it in foreign banks.  It is important to note that individuals operating in the cash 
economy already engage in this type of behavior.111  Accordingly, to provide a better 
(rather than a perfect) policy alternative, the proposal should not be concerned with tax 
accumulation per se but should try only to make sure that participants in the formal 
economy do not also begin to engage in this type of behavior.  For example, consider 
service providers in a family business who underreport their cash earnings and avoid 
depositing them.  As long as they store or (more likely) spend the money, the probability 
of detection is negligible, and the possibility that they will face substantial penalties is 
practically non-existent.  The important challenge, therefore, is not to get them to deposit 
their cash proceeds but to get those businesses in which they subsequently spend their 
cash to deposit most of that cash.  Meeting this challenge is plausible because, in 
developed economies, a substantial portion of the economic activity is undertaken by big 
firms, the government, and other formal-economy businesses.  Hence, the service 
providers would find it difficult to realize the consumption power of their cash assets 
solely within the cash economy. 
To further prevent a situation of never-deposited cash proceeds, a government 
can impose a requirement that a certain amount of cash business receipts be deposited.  
For example, such a requirement can say that every business should deposit any cash 
received as business proceeds that exceeds the higher amount of either four thousand 
dollars or five percent of annual gross receipts.  While this requirement is likely to have 
no impact on sellers in the cash economy, it can provide members of the formal economy 
with an additional incentive to deposit cash received.  Put differently, such a requirement 
would not induce the drug lord to deposit cash, but it could affect the behaviors of his 
lawyer and accountant.  It would likely assure that the manager of the department store 
where the drug lord does his shopping deposits the cash received.  
Another way to limit cash accumulation behavior is to require employers to pay 
wages via pay-to-order checks or by direct deposits.  Furthermore, tax authorities could 
deny part or all of the deduction of certain large business expenses paid in cash.  These 
suggestions do not aim to eliminate cash storage entirely but rather to ensure that the 
formal economy deposits most of its cash proceeds. 
                                                                                                                                                 
This differs from the situation of the financial markets where there are only a limited number of relatively 
homogeneously regulated players.  Therefore, unlike with the financial sector, policymakers cannot expect 
nearly full compliance unless they establish a strong regulatory regime.  
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 Diane Whitmore, What Are Food Stamps Worth? (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section, 
Working Paper No. 468, 2002), available at 
https://www.msu.edu/~dickertc/301f06/whatarefoodstampsworth.pdf. 
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  Morse et al., supra note 29, at 49. 
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The ability of taxpayers to substitute foreign financial institutions (which 
presumably do not impose a cash tax) for domestic ones creates a serious concern for 
policymakers.  Even though tax-related information-sharing technologies, practices, and 
agreements have seriously developed over the course of the last ten years,112 foreign 
financial institutions have no information-reporting or -withholding obligations.  Hence, 
taxpayers can deposit and withdraw cash from those institutions and use it back home.  
Although this state of affairs is unlikely to change in the near future, channeling 
cash abroad involves considerable transaction costs.  While managing a foreign bank 
account through the Internet is relatively easy, depositing and withdrawing cash on a 
regular basis is not.  Because most individuals do not live within a reasonable distance of 
an open border, withdrawing cash in a foreign country would be a tax-avoidance scheme 
with prohibitive transaction costs.  To be effective in the EU, the single currency and 
open borders may require that the cash tax be imposed by all the major member states.113  
Alternatively, a single EU country can impose the cash tax unilaterally as long as there 
are strong information-sharing mechanisms in neighboring countries that would report 
large cash deposits, transfers, and withdrawals by its residents. 114   Nevertheless, 
taxpayers with considerable amounts of cash would seek to channel large amounts of 
funds to foreign banks in offshore financial centers with low tax rates and bank-secrecy 
laws.  Cash channeling abroad is already taking place and is potentially a risky practice 
subject to criminal penalty. 115   The cash tax should not be expected to solve all 
problems—and this set of problems is probably better dealt with through  
money-laundering legislation. 
3. Concerns Over Cash-Tax Windfalls 
A cash tax would result in a windfall to existing cash holders.  While taxpayers 
with deposited funds would have to pay a tax upon withdrawing the cash, existing cash 
holders would have their cash assets tax-free.  This concern may not be substantial in the 
case of typical households, where cash is generally held in relatively small amounts.  
However, this windfall may turn out to be significant in the case of certain cash economy 
participants, particularly those involved in criminal transactions such as the drug trade.116  
In this context, the cash-tax windfall may increase political resistance to the tax.  
Policymakers can address this problem via two policies: demonetize existing cash assets 
and inflate deposited amounts.  However, the cash tax would still offer a superior 
alternative to the current regime even if policymakers tried to implement the tax without 
addressing the windfall problem.  
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Demonetizing requires replacing all cash assets with new ones during a given 
time period after which the old notes and coins would no longer be valid.117  Because the 
replacement of cash requires depositing it or exchanging it in financial institutions, a 
withholding cash tax can easily be imposed.  However, demonetization involves 
significant administrative and compliance costs, especially in the case of cash assets that 
are frequently used by non-residents (namely the Euro and the U.S. dollar).  Additionally, 
trying to impose a cash tax on foreign financial institutions may prove to be a difficult 
move from a foreign policy perspective.  
Policymakers can also choose to inflate deposited currencies to counterbalance 
the windfall of cash holders.  In fact, unless a government wants to implement capital 
control measures, such a step may be necessary as a transitional policy to avoid a 
scenario in which large withdrawals are made prior to the introduction of the cash tax.118  
This, however, may increase inflation and result in problems associated with cash assets 
deposited by individuals and corporations in foreign institutions.  
Finally, policymakers can choose to adopt partial policies (e.g., only demonetize 
large notes above the value of one hundred dollars, which are those typically used in drug 
trade) or to take no action.  As noted, the cash tax is a rough-justice approach.  If no 
adjustment is made to offset the windfall, a drug lord may indeed experience a short-term 
windfall.  However, in the long run, when the drug lord wishes to realize his cash-based 
consumption power—by buying a house for example—the money would enter into the 
financial system and thus be subject to the cash tax.  
IV. BEYOND TAX ANALYSIS: DETERMINING THE CASH TAX RATE BY 
CALIBRATING THE SOCIAL COSTS OF CASH 
As demonstrated in Part II, the costs and benefits associated with tax anonymity 
have been recognized by different strands of economics, including the literature dealing 
with public finance, the shadow economy, economic crime, and monetary regulation.  
Interestingly, each of these literatures views the case for and against cash only from its 
relatively narrow perspective.  This part argues that the article’s Pigovian framework 
allows the cash tax to look beyond the tax-evasion question.  Sound policymaking should 
determine the cash-tax rate that would optimize the use of cash.  To be clear, the article 
does not argue that the cash tax should eliminate other cash-related practices such as the 
shadow economy.  It does suggest, however, that when determining the cash-tax rate, 
policymakers should try to view the externalities of cash in a broad way and not restrict 
themselves to curtailing tax evasion.  
The suggested approach is very different from current scholarship.  With some 
important exceptions,119 most tax policy literature focuses on the costs of tax evasion and 
offers traditional mechanisms of more information reporting and audit-based enforcement 
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to reduce it without considering alternative anti-evasion methods.120  Similarly, monetary 
regulation literature typically offers solutions that only aim to reduce the cost of cash as 
an inefficient payment method when compared to debit card payments.121  The literature 
dealing with international money laundering and economic crime examines ways to 
reduce the use of cash by organized crime groups but usually fails to consider other 
negative externalities associated with cash usage.122  
While the different solutions advanced typically do not conflict with each other, 
they all fail to consider the social costs of cash and who should bear them.  The cash-tax 
framework, on the other hand, allows policymakers to do precisely that—aggregate the 
costs of cash and suggest that the majority of those costs should be borne by cash users.  
As such, the cash-tax proposal can operate as an important and effective supplement to 
other policies that seek to limit some negative externalities associated with the usage of 
cash. 
The starting point of the analysis is that anonymous cash transactions are an 
unavoidable feature of the modern economy.  Moreover, as long as cash is a legal method 
of exchange, a great number of cash transactions will not be reported.  The analysis 
further assumes that optimal cash policy will not require eliminating all unreported cash 
transactions.  Instead, the problem of underreporting should be approached as a collective 
action problem123 in which the state can promote the efficient use of cash by forcing cash 
users to internalize the externalities of their cash preference.  The rate of this tax should 
aim to reflect the true costs of cash anonymity as closely as possible—it should be 
calibrated against many margins and not restricted to questions of tax evasion.  
The direct effects of revenue loss associated with underreporting of cash 
transactions were discussed in the previous part.124  Most of the social costs associated 
with cash are easy to notice but difficult to quantify.  Hence, rather than trying to model 
the true costs of cash, this sub-part points to the full range of cash externalities that 
policymakers should consider when setting the cash-tax rate.  
First, income underreporting makes governments' attempts to monitor their 
economies much more difficult. 125   For example, if state welfare programs are  
means-tested and depend on recipients' incomes, then having a cash economy can reduce 
their accuracy.126  This would result in inefficiency because it would provide welfare 
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recipients with incentives to remain in the inefficient cash economy.  Furthermore, if the 
welfare system is considered inaccurate, inefficient, or unfair, then the willingness of the 
more affluent taxpayers operating in the formal economy to subsidize it would be 
reduced.  
Another example of the economic monitoring difficulty associated with cash is 
how the cash economy distorts the structure of tax collection.  The difficulty in raising 
revenues from the cash sector requires changing the overall tax mix so that other sources 
of income (e.g., wages in the formal economy) or fiscal instruments (e.g., various 
consumption taxes) are taxed at a higher rate.127  These higher marginal tax rates (laid on 
the formal economy) can be very distorting—in fact, high marginal income tax rates are 
known to reduce work incentives.128 
Second, as mentioned in Part II.C, cash provides a method of exchange for the 
shadow economy.  In addition to being less productive than the formal economy,129 the 
shadow economy creates efficiency costs that are very similar to those of cash-based 
regulated businesses that evade a significant amount of taxation.130  The actual costs of 
the cash economy are more difficult to measure because the cost of regulation and the 
lack of it are both hard to assess.  The unregulated shadow economy may reduce welfare 
if, for example, one assumes that labor regulation represents social preferences on issues 
of minimum wage, immigration requirements, labor safety, and product liability.  
However, many of the unreported and unregulated shadow economy activities are not 
antisocial doings but simply byproducts of the temporary and informal employment 
realities of low-skilled individuals that are often too small to justify reporting. 131  
Additionally, many shadow-economy activities would not exist if taxpayers were 
required to comply with the costs of government taxes and labor regulations.132  Some 
studies suggest that the size of the shadow economy is correlated with the more rapid 
growth in developed countries.133  Cash may therefore allow governments in developed 
countries to engage in price discrimination—putting tax and regulatory requirements only 
on productive industries without hampering the existence of the less productive ones.  
This article does not argue that the shadow economy is good or bad, but that all these 
effects should be taken into consideration. 
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Additionally, in weighing the employment and growth benefits of a shadow 
economy, policymakers should assess whether there are alternative means to promote 
employment and productivity among unskilled workers. 134   The contribution of the 
current proposal is that it does not take the traditional course of fighting the shadow 
economy through deterrence.135  Instead, the article’s proposal leaves it to policymakers 
to try to establish the optimal level of shadow-economy activities by adjusting the  
cash-tax rate.  
Third, as noted in Part II.C, cash helps facilitate criminal activities.  Estimating 
the overall costs of crime is a relatively new field of study, 136 and the costs themselves 
encompass a large spectrum of direct costs (e.g., law enforcement expenditures and tax 
revenue losses) and indirect costs (e.g., insurance costs and lost work days).137  The 
difference between the shadow economy and criminal activities is that, in the case of 
criminal activities, governments should more actively seek to eliminate them, rather than 
to just optimize their frequency.  While crime reduces welfare, attempts to eliminate it are 
likely to be very costly and therefore not desirable.  Just as a government should not 
place policemen at every street corner to eliminate crime, the cash tax should not aim to 
make criminal activities entirely unprofitable.  Instead, the cash tax should make 
participation in these markets less profitable and more costly, which would hopefully 
encourage their contraction.  Policymakers should account for the fact that a non-trivial 
amount of the cash used in developed economies is directed towards purchasing drugs, 
illegal sex, and gambling services and facilitating other criminal activities. 138   This 
suggests that a Pigovian cash tax should be adjusted upwards to account for more than 
the estimated revenue and efficiency costs of tax evasion. 
Fourth, one of the major costs of the cash economy is that it fosters norms of tax 
evasion by income underreporting and facilitates mistrust in the tax regime.  This is a 
vicious cycle because tax evasion norms and fiscal mistrust make tax enforcement more 
challenging and are difficult to change.139  While the cash tax would not eliminate the 
problems associated with underreporting, it would help to reduce the amount of 
unreported income.  It would also create a more level playing field between the formal 
and informal economies by reducing the lack-of-tax subsidy to the cash economy.    
Fifth, cash supplies anonymity for a wide range of purposes.  Cash can therefore 
serve as a way to hide assets from non-tax-authority creditors.  To the extent that this 
activity is considered to be an antisocial behavior that requires government intervention, 
policymakers may wish to take it into account as well.  
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Sixth, cash assets are already subject to an implicit inflation tax.  In a  
low-inflation environment, inflation offers a suboptimal cash-tax solution because of its 
low salience and the fact that it is imposed on all holders of nominal assets, many of 
which are not necessarily in the form of cash.  Accordingly, inflation may have little 
effect on extensive cash-tax users who do not have significant net cash holdings.140  
Nevertheless, policymakers should take this implicit inflation tax into account when 
calibrating the cash-tax rate. 
Finally, despite the negative externalities of cash, it is important to bear in mind 
that cash has some positive externalities as well.  Apart from providing a convenient 
payment method for small purchases, cash can provide privacy for a wide range of legal 
transactions.  Taxpayers may value privacy for many reasons—because they purchase 
discrete goods and services (e.g., legal pornography), want to avoid identity theft or 
providing marketing information to third parties, or want to make a private transfer to a 
friend.  While these privacy concerns do not render the cash tax an inappropriate method 
for monitoring the negative externalities of cash usage, they may counterbalance some of 
these negative externalities.  When entering this discussion, one must remember that 
making privacy somewhat more expensive is not necessarily equivalent to infringing on 
it.  While the cash-tax proposal definitely makes cash-purchase-related privacy more 
expensive, it may be considered less intrusive than other measures to counter cash-related 
tax evasion, such as aggressive audits.  Privacy as a social value has many  
dimensions—and when considering how to best balance it in light of other public values 
and interests, policymakers should weigh the potential effects of each policy on it. 
Regardless of what the costs of cash are determined to be, it is important to 
remember that determining the cash-tax rate would be a process of trial and error.  As a 
Pigovian tax, the cash tax has the objective of promoting a shift of most formal-hyphen 
transactions to non-cash methods of payment.  Hence, while the cash tax could be raised 
gradually to reduce the political objections to it, it needs to ultimately be high enough to 
encourage this shift.  On the other hand, the cash tax should not be prohibitive—if set too 
high, formal and informal economy participants would avoid depositing cash by shifting 
to cash substitutes to avoid the tax upon withdrawal.  The rate of the cash tax should 
therefore start low (perhaps around five percent), with the notion that policymakers 
should determine the ultimate rate through an ongoing process that aims at setting a wise 
rather than a correct rate.  
Ideally, policymakers would aim to set the cash-tax rate above the ordinary 
consumption tax rate to account for tax evasion and other negative externalities of cash.  
However, the ultimate goal of the cash tax is to allow a more efficient use of cash by 
imposing as many of the costs as possible that are associated with cash usage on those 
participating in and benefiting from the cash economy.  Accordingly, a wise (and 
cautious) policymaker would take into account the probable market salience of the tax,141 
and therefore likely prefer a lower cash-tax rate to avoid an inefficient shift to cash 
substitutes.  This suggests that many of the cash economy participants would prefer to 
pay the lower cash-tax than to report their activities.  This result would fall short of 
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eliminating the benefits of underreporting but would result in higher revenues and greater 
resource allocation efficiency when compared to the zero effective tax rate currently 
imposed on these activities.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The cash-tax proposal presented in this article asserts that, instead of focusing on 
finding and prosecuting the wrongdoers, tax policymakers should put more emphasis on 
trying to tax them.  
This proposal is built on two prongs: first, cash is no longer as much of a 
necessary medium of exchange in developed countries and therefore could be shifted 
away from with relatively low social costs.  Second, transactions that create negative 
externalities due to tax evasion, the shadow economy, or the criminal economy all 
involve cash.  Therefore, policymakers can manipulate the supply and price of cash to 
control some of its negative externalities.  
The article offers a Pigovian tax framework to deal with one of the oldest 
problems haunting human civilization—tax evasion through underreporting.  Some 
humility is in order when approaching a phenomenon that has persistently troubled 
enforcement agencies since the days of the Pharaohs.  The cash-tax proposal cannot, and 
does not aim to, eliminate tax evasion and does not argue that investment in other tax 
enforcement mechanisms should be abandoned.  It does, however, wish to supply tax 
authorities with an additional fiscal tool that deviates from their current approach of more 
audit enforcements to deal with this issue.  Adding this tool can help tax authorities gain 
an important advantage in the long war of attrition that they have been fighting against 
tax evaders operating in the cash economy.   
 
